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Within the domain of the philosophy of race, the work of Immanuel Kant has
sparked a lively debate among scholars. Although being often described as one of
the key figures in the history of cosmopolitanism – emphasizing the equal moral
worth of all persons – many theorists have also pointed at Kant’s endorsement of
a racial hierarchy in essays like ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philoso‐
phy’ (1788). The implications of Kant’s views on race for the universality of his
moral theory, however, are interpreted quite differently. Some theorists are very
skeptical and argue that Kant’s philosophy – especially his anthropology and
geography – contains ‘expression of a virulent and theoretically based racism, at a
time when scientific racism was still in its infancy’ (Bernasconi, Kant as a Unfami‐
liar Source of Racism, 2002: 145) or that it offers ‘the strongest, if not the only,
sufficiently articulated theoretical philosophical justification of the superior/infe‐
rior classification of “races of men” of any European writer up to his time’ (Eze,
The Color of Reason, 1997: 129). Others accept the fact that Kant expressed racist
beliefs but deny that Kant’s ‘basic critical philosophy and moral theory’ is infected
with a form of deep racism (Hill and Boxill, Kant and Race, 2001: 449) or argue
that Kant changed his mind about race during the 1790s and that he can, there‐
fore, still be seen as one of the champions of cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld, Kant
and Cosmopolitanism, 2012).
Interestingly – and with this we come to the topic of Flikschuh’s and Ypi’s volume
Kant and Colonialism – a similarly structured debate has developed regarding
Kant’s position on colonialism. Although he never developed a systematic theory
within this domain, the few passages in Kant’s work dedicated to the topic display
an analogous kind of ambiguity or tension as can be found in his reflections on
race. The ninth proposition in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Aim’ (1784), for example, contains the following well-know lines: ‘if one starts
from Greek history (…) then one will discover a regular course of improvement of
state constitutions in our part of the world (which will probably someday give
laws to all the others)’ (AA 8:29, my emphasis). Or take the subsequent claim from
the ‘Doenhoff Lectures on Physical Geography’ (1782): ‘[t]he current fate of India
depends as little on the French as on the English, but this much is certain, that if
they were to be ruled by a European sovereign, the nation would become happier’.
Colonial practices are then not only tolerable but perhaps also necessary for pro‐
gress. At the same time, however, it is quite easy to find a strong condemnation
of most forms of colonialism in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ (1795) and ‘Metaphy‐
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sics of Morals’ (1797). After having raised the question whether it shouldn’t be
allowed to found colonies in the ‘great expanses of land in other parts of the
world’ – land that would otherwise remain uninhabited and unused – Kant leaves
no doubt about his response: ‘it is easy to see through this veil of injustice (Jesuit‐
ism), which would sanction any means to good ends. Such a way of acquiring land
is therefore to be repudiated’ (AA 6:266).
These different views of Kant regarding the permissibility of colonialism not only
raise several important and challenging questions but also show the need of a sys‐
tematic exploration of Kant’s thoughts. Although more has been written on the
topic in the past – also by the contributors themselves – Kant and Colonialism
rightly claims to be the first collection dedicated to such a systematic undertak‐
ing. The main aim of the volume is a limited one. The emphasis in the different
contributions is ‘on exploring the problem of colonialism as Kant came increas‐
ingly to perceive it from within the framework of his cosmopolitan thinking’ (p.
9). And because the chapters work ‘within the parameters of Kant’s Eurocentric
cosmopolitanism’ (p. 10), the collection doesn’t contain a detailed or comprehen‐
sive engagement with the writings of theorists like Tully or McCarthy who explic‐
itly focus on the effects of Kant’s Eurocentricism for current cosmopolitan
debates.
How to understand Kant’s view on colonialism? What explains the ‘gradual shift
in Kant’s overall assessment of European dealings with non-European peoples’ (p.
9)? What role do cosmopolitan right, international trade, war, and land claims
play in Kant’s thoughts? What kind of wrong is colonialism and can claims to
restoration be rightly made in the context of colonial appropriation? These are
the main questions being addressed in the volume. These questions, however, can
only be convincingly answered if some kind of clarity can be reached regarding
Kant’s uses of the term ‘colony’ and ‘province’. That is why the book starts with
Anthony Pagden’s critical analysis of the ‘four accounts of settlements overseas’ –
deriving from different ‘historical and legal definitions of the Roman “colony” and
the Greek apoika’ (p. 19) – that Kant provides us with. Unfortunately, though,
Pagden’s interesting taxonomy of Kant’s different conceptions of ‘colony’ and
‘colonialism’ has not been systematically taken up (with the exception of a few
short references in the chapters by Kleingeld, Muthu, and Ypi) in the rest of the
volume.
Pauline Kleingeld’s chapter explicitly focuses on the gradual shift in Kant’s
thoughts on racism and colonialism. Kleingeld convincingly and meticulously
argues that ‘Kant’s initial endorsement and his subsequent criticism of colonial‐
ism are closely related to his changing views on race’ (p. 43); an endorsement of
racial hierarchy that he dropped during the mid-1790s. Kleingeld, however,
doesn’t explore the reasons or motivations behind Kant’s second thoughts on col‐
onialism and racism. Lea Ypi is one of the few theorists who tries to provide read‐
ers with such an explanation (motivation) based on the place and development of
Kant’s notion of biological predisposition in his philosophy of history. In her con‐
tribution, Ypi places Kant’s thought ‘on race and commercial relations in the con‐
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text of a systematic discussion of Kant’s philosophy of history, its teleological
principles, and the related development of Kant’s theory of right and politics’ (p.
100). Kant’s understanding of judgment and natural teleology in the third Cri‐
tique, after all, not only has important implications for the relation between
moral theory and the philosophy of biology but also for his political and legal phi‐
losophy. Instead of seeing (international) trade as a guarantee for peace and pro‐
gress, commercial relations ‘simply illustrate the empirical conditions under
which cosmopolitan right can be established’ (p. 122). What matters first and
foremost is the duty to create just social and political institutions.
Another exception that should be mentioned in the context of Kant’s ‘second
thoughts’ is Ian Storey’s article in History of Political Thought (2015, 36/4) ‘Empire
and Natural Order in Kant’s “Second Thoughts” on Race’ in which he – like Ypi –
points to Kant’s changing understanding of human judgments and its effect on
his teleological view of history. Although both Ypi and Sankar Muthu (in his chap‐
ter on Kant’s notion of ‘unsocial sociability’) refer to Storey’s text, it would have
been interesting to know Kleingeld’s response to the proposals made by Ypi and
Storey.
Arthur Ripstein and Peter Niesen analyze Kant’s rejection of colonialism and sub‐
sequent claims for redress within the context of his views on international law
and cosmopolitan right. Ripstein uses a practice-based argument – the idea that
‘the norm relevant to a certain form of human interaction is in some sense to be
found in the form of interaction itself’(p. 163) – to argue that colonial practices
can be objected to on three distinct levels: the impermissibility of securing access
to new markets and acquiring territory on the basis of war, the objectionability of
‘colonizing a people’ instead of ‘simply incorporating the territory into the con‐
quering nation’ (p. 147), and the wrong of disregarding their interests and right
to self-determination while ruling the colony. The last two compound the wrong
of the first.
By making a distinction between three levels of international law, natural (1),
transitional (2), and public (3), Niesen, on the other hand, shows that Kant does
leave room for claims to restoration in the context of colonialism. Restorative jus‐
tice, however, only has a rightful place in the second and third domains but not in
the first. Niesen also convincingly argues, for example with regard to preventive
warfare, that the division between the different levels of international law can be
used to show that ‘Kant’s positions in Toward Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of
Right (…) represent a single consistent theory’ (p .173). The claims in the Doc‐
trine of Right operate on the first level, those in Perpetual Peace on the third.
Unfortunately, not all chapters from this interesting and well-wrought book can
be discussed within the limited confines of this review. All contributions in Kant
and Colonialism, however, are of high quality and provide readers with a broad
array of nuanced and stimulating insights in Kant’s thoughts on colonialism and
cosmopolitanism.
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